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Abstract
In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) the intended steady state
is locally but not globally stable under adaptive learning, and un-
stable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to
expectations. In the current paper a modified model is presented that
includes a locally stable stagnation regime as a possible outcome aris-
ing from large expectation shocks. Policy implications are examined.
Suﬃciently large temporary increases in government spending can dis-
lodge the economy from the stagnation regime and restore the natural
stabilizing dynamics. More specific policy proposals are presented and
discussed.
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1 Introduction
The economic experiences of 2008-10 have highlighted the issue of appropri-
ate macroeconomic policy in deep recessions. A particular concern is what
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macroeconomic policies should be used when slow growth and high unem-
ployment persist even after the monetary policy interest rate instrument has
been at or close to the zero net interest rate lower bound for a sustained
period of time. In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2010), using a New Keynesian model with learning, we argued
that if the economy is subject to a large negative expectational shock, such
as plausibly arose in response to the financial crisis of 2008-9, then it may
be necessary, in order to return the economy to the targeted steady state, to
supplement monetary policy with fiscal policy, in particular with temporary
increases in government spending.
The importance of expectations in generating a “liquidity trap” at the
zero-lower bound is nowwidely understood. For example, Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2001b), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a)
show the possibility of multiple equilibria under perfect foresight, with a
continuum of paths to an unintended low or negative inflation steady state.1
Recently, Bullard (2010) has argued that data from Japan and the US over
2002-2010 suggest that we should take seriously the possibility that “the US
economy may become enmeshed in a Japanese-style deflationary outcome
within the next several years.”
The learning approach provides a perspective on this issue that is quite
diﬀerent from the rational expectations results.2 As shown in Evans, Guse,
and Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2010), when expecta-
tions are formed using adaptive learning, the targeted steady state is locally
stable under standard policy, but it is not globally stable. However, the po-
tential problem is not convergence to the deflation steady state, but instead
unstable trajectories. The danger is that suﬃciently pessimistic expectations
of future inflation, output and consumption can become self-reinforcing, lead-
ing to a deflationary process accompanied by declining inflation and output.
These unstable paths arise when expectations are pessimistic enough to fall
into what we call the “deflation trap.” Thus, while in Bullard (2010) the local
stability results of the learning approach to expectations is characterized as
one of the forms of denial of “the peril,” the learning perspective is actually
more alarmist in that it takes seriously these divergent paths.
As we showed in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), in this deflation
1See Krugman (1998) for a seminal discussion and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
for a recent analyses and references.
2For a closely related argument see Reifschneider and Williams (2000).
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trap region aggressive monetary policy, i.e. immediate reductions on interest
rates to close to zero, will in some cases avoid the deflationary spiral and
return the economy to the intended steady state. However, if the pessimistic
expectation shock is too large then temporary increases in government spend-
ing may be needed. The policy response in the US, UK and Europe has to
some extent followed the policies advocated in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008). Monetary policy has been quick, decisive and aggressive, with, for
example, the US federal funds rate reduced to near zero levels by the end of
2008. In the US, in addition to a variety of less conventional interventions in
the financial markets by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, including the
TARP measures in late 2008 and a large scale expansion of the Fed balance
sheet designed to stabilize the banking system, there was the $727 billion
ARRA stimulus package passed in February 2009.
While the US economy has stabilized, the recovery has to date been weak
and the unemployment rate has been both very high and roughly constant
for about one year. At the same time, although inflation is low, and hover-
ing on the brink of deflation, we have not seen the economy recording large
and increasing deflation rates.3 From the viewpoint of Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008), various interpretations of the data are possible, depend-
ing on one’s view of the severity of the initial negative expectations shock
and the strength of the monetary and fiscal policy impacts. However, since
recent US (and Japanese) data may also consistent with convergence to a de-
flation steady state, it is worth revisiting the issue of whether this outcome
can in some circumstances arise under learning.
In this paper I develop a modification of the model of Evans, Guse, and
Honkapohja (2008) that generates a new outcome under adaptive learning.
Introducing asymmetric adjustment costs into the Rotemberg model of price
setting leads to the possibility of convergence to a stagnation regime following
a large pessimistic shock. In the stagnation regime, inflation is trapped
at a low steady deflation level, consistent with zero net interest rates, and
there is a continuum of consumption and output levels that may emerge.
Thus, once again, the learning approach raises the alarm concerning the
evolution of the economy when faced with a large shock, since the outcome
may be persistently ineﬃciently low levels of output. This is in contrast to
the rational expectations approach of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe
3However the CPI 12-month inflation measure, excluding food and energy, does show
a downward trend over the last several years, and in September 2010 was at 0.8%.
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(2001b), in which the deflation steady state has output levels that are not
greatly diﬀerent from the targeted steady state.
In the stagnation regime, fiscal policy, taking the form of temporary in-
creases in government spending, is important as a policy tool. Increased
government spending raises output, but leaves the economy within the stag-
nation regime until raised to the point at which a critical level of output is
reached. Once output exceeds the critical level, the usual stabilizing mech-
anisms of the economy resume, pushing consumption, output and inflation
back to the targeted steady state, and permitting a scaling back of govern-
ment expenditure.
After introducing the model, and exploring its principal policy implica-
tions, I discuss the policy options more generally for the US economy.
2 The Model
We use the model of Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), itself a discrete-
time version of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001b), but with ra-
tional expectations replaced by adaptive learning. The model is a stylized
“New Keynesian” model of the type that underlies widely-used DSGE mod-
els. For simplicity we use the version without capital and with consolidated
household-firms. As in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001b), the
pricing friction is modeled as a cost of adjusting prices, in the spirit of Rotem-
berg (1982), rather than a Calvo-type friction. An important advantage of
the Rotemberg pricing friction is that the resulting model does not need to
be linearized, making global analysis possible.
Details of the model are given in the Appendix. For simplicity I use a
nonstochastic version of the model. The dynamic first-order Euler conditions,
satisfied by optimal decision-making, lead to aggregate equations of the form
πt = Hπ(π
e
t+1, ct, gt) (1)
ct = Hc(π
e
t+1, c
e
t+1, Rt), (2)
where ct is consumption at time t, πt is the inflation factor, gt is government
purchases of goods and services and Rt ≥ 1 is the interest-rate factor on
one-period debt. Equation (1) is the “Phillips equation” for this model, and
equation (2) is the “IS equation.” The functions Hπ and Hc are determined
by equations (7)-(8) in the Appendix. When linearized at a steady state both
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equations take the standard form. Because this is a model without capital,
aggregate output satisfies yt = ct + gt.
Under the learning approach followed here, we treat equations (1)-(2)
as arising from aggregations of the corresponding behavioral equations of
individual agents, and assume that they hold whether or not the expectations
held by agents are fully “rational.” Put diﬀerently, (1)-(2) are temporary
equilibrium equations that determine πt and ct, given government purchases
gt, the interest rate Rt and expectation cet+1 and π
e
t+1.
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The particular from of the Phillips equation arises from a quadratic infla-
tion adjustment cost k(πt,j) = 0.5(πt,j−1)2, where πt,j = Pt,jPt−1,j is the inflation
factor for agent j’s good. The IS equation (2) is simply the standard con-
sumption Euler equation obtained from u0(ct,j) = β(Rt/πet+1)u
0(cet+1,j), where
u(c) is the utility of consumption and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Note
that because πt measures the gross inflation rate (or inflation factor), πt−1 is
the usual net inflation rate. Similarly β−1−1 is the net discount rate, Rt−1
is the net interest rate and Rt = 1 corresponds to the zero lower bound on
interest rates. The variables cet+1 and π
e
t+1 denote the time t expectations of
the values of these variables in t+ 1.
We next discuss fiscal and monetary policy. We assume that in normal
times government spending is constant over time, i.e. gt = g > 0. The gov-
ernment’s flow budget constraint is that government spending plus interest
must be financed by taxes, debt and seigniorage. Taxes are treated as lump-
sum and are assumed to follow a feedback rule with respect to government
debt, with a feedback parameter that ensures convergence to a specified finite
debt level in a steady state equilibrium.
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a continuous nondecreasing interest-
rate rule5
Rt = f
¡
πet+1
¢
. (3)
We assume the monetary authorities have an inflation target π∗ > 1. For
example if the inflation target is 2% p.a. then π∗ = 1.02. From the con-
sumption Euler equation it can be seen that at a steady state ct = cet+1 = c,
4In the learning literature the formulation (1)-(2) is sometimes called the Euler-learning
approach. This approach emphasizes short planning horizons, in contrast to the infinite-
horizon approach emphasized, for example, in Preston (2006). In Evans and Honkapohja
(2010) we found that the main qualitative results obtained in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008) carried over to an infinite-horizon learning formulation.
5Here for convenience we assume Rt is set on the basis of πet+1 instead of πt as in Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
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Figure 1: The Taylor rule and Fisher equation.
πt = πet+1 = π, and Rt = R, the Fisher equation
R = π/β
must be satisfied, and the steady state real interest rate factor is β−1. The
function f(π) is assumed to be consistent at π∗ with the Fisher equation,
i.e. f (π∗) = π∗/β. In addition we assume that f 0(π∗) > β−1, so that the
Taylor principle is satisfied at π∗. Because of the ZLB (zero lower bound on
net interest rates) there will also be another steady state at a lower inflation
rate, and if (3) is such that Rt = 1 at low πet+1 then the other steady state is
one of deflation, corresponding to inflation factor π = β < 1. For simplicity
I will assume a linear spline rule of the form shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1, which graphs this interest rate rule combined with the steady
state Fisher equation, shows that there are two steady states that arise in
this model, the targeted steady state at π∗ and the unintended steady state
at π = β, which corresponds to a deflation rate at the net discount rate.
Finally we need to specify how expectations are updated over time. Since
we have omitted all exogenous random shocks in the model we can choose a
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particularly simple form of adaptive learning rule, namely
πet+1 = π
e
t + φ(πt−1 − πet) (4)
cet+1 = c
e
t + φ(ct−1 − cet), (5)
where 0 < φ < 1 parameterizes the response of expectations to the most
recent data point and is usually assumed to be small. If there were observable
random shocks in the model, then a more general formulation would be a
form of least-squares learning in which the variables to be forecasted are
regressed on the exogenous observables and an intercept.6 This would not
alter the qualitative results. The crucial assumption of adaptive learning is
that expectations are driven by the evolution of observed data. This might be
thought of as the “Missouri” view of expectations, since Missouri’s unoﬃcial
motto is the “Show Me state”. On the adaptive learning approach, agents
are unlikely to increase or decrease their forecasts, say, of inflation unless
they have data-based reasons for doing so.7
This completes the description of the model. In summary the dynamics
of the model is determined by (i) a temporary equilibrium map (1)-(2), the
interest-rate rule (3), government spending gt = g and (ii) the expectations
updating rules (4)-(5). As is well-known (e.g. see Evans and Honkapohja
(2001)) for small φ the dynamics are well approximated by a corresponding
ordinary diﬀerential equation and hence, for the case at hand, by a two-
dimensional phase diagram. This is illustrated by Figure A1 in the Appendix.
Corresponding phase diagrams were given in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008) for an interest-rate rule Rt = f (πt) with f a smooth, increasing,
convex function. Qualitatively the results show the results described in the
Introduction: the π∗ steady state is locally stable, while the deflation steady
state is locally unstable, taking the form of a saddle, with a deflation trap
region in the southwest part of the space. In the deflation trap region tra-
jectories are unstable and follow divergent trajectories under learning.
The model, of course, is very simple and highly stylized. More realistic
versions would incorporate various elements standard in DSGE models, such
as habit persistence, partial indexation, separate wage and price dynamics,
6If habit persistence, indexation, lags and/or serially correlated exogenous shocks were
present, then least-squares-type learning using vector autoregessions would be appropriate.
7The adaptive learning approach can be extended to incorporate credible expected
future interest rate policy, as announced by the Fed. This channel is included in Evans
and Honkapohja (2010). See Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2009) for a general discussion
of incorporating forward-looking structural information into adaptive learning frameworks.
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capital and costs of adjusting the capital stock, and explicit models of job
search and unemployment, as well as a model of financial intermediation.
Thus the model here is very simple and incomplete. Nonetheless it provides
a story of some key mechanisms that are of great concern to policymakers.
3 A Modified Model
We now come to the modification mentioned in the Introduction. To motivate
this we briefly reflect on the experience of the US in the 1930s, the Japanese
economy since the mid 1990s, and the experience of the US over 2007-2010, as
well as the data summary in Figure 1 of Bullard (2010). According to Evans,
Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), if we are in the unstable region then we will
eventually see a deflationary spiral, with eventually falling deflation rates.
However we have not seen this yet in the US, and this has not happened
in Japan, despite an expended period of deflation. Similarly, in the US in
the 1930s, after two or three years of marked deflation, the inflation rate
stabilized at near zero rates.8
There are a number of avenues within the model that could explain these
outcomes. As noted by Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), if policymakers
do use aggressive fiscal policy to prevent inflation falling below a threshold,
but choose that threshold too low, then this can lead to another locally
stable unintended steady state. This situation might arise if policymakers
are unwilling to pursue an aggressive increase in government spending, e.g.
because of concerns about the size of government debt, unless deflation is
unmistakable and significant. This is one possible explanation for Japan’s
experience.
An alternative avenue, which may perhaps be appealing for the recent US
experience, is that the initial negative expectational shock may have placed
us very close to the saddlepath. We would then move toward the low-inflation
steady state, where the economy could hover for an extended period of time,
before “declaring” itself, i.e. beginning a long path back to the targeted
steady state at π∗ or falling into a deflationary spiral. An extension of this
line of thought is that after the initial expectational shock the economy may
have been in the deflation trap region, and that the fiscal stimulus measures
8The initial significant deflation in 1931 and 1932 can perhaps be explained as due to
reverse bottleneck eﬀects (as in Evans (1985)), i.e. reductions in prices of goods that had
been at capacity production in the prior years.
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then pushed the economy close to the saddle path, with a weak recovery.
For the US in the 1930s, one might argue, along the lines of Eggerts-
son (2008), that the New Deal policies to stabilize prices had both direct
and expectational eﬀects that prevented deflation and assisted in initiating
a fragile recovery, which finally became robust when a large fiscal stimulus,
taking the form of war-time expenditures, pushed the economy back to full
employment.
However, we now set aside these possible explanations and pursue an
alternative (and in a sense complementary) approach that modifies the model
to incorporate an asymmetry in the adjustment of wages and prices. To do
this we modify the quadratic functional form k(πt,j) = 0.5(πt,j − 1)2 for
price adjustment costs, which was made only because it is standard and
analytically convenient. There is a long tradition of arguing that agents are
subject to money illusion, which is manifested mainly in a strong resistance
to reductions in nominal wages.9 To incorporate this one can introduce an
asymmetry in k(πt,j), with agents being more averse to reductions in πt,j
than to equal increases in πt,j. For convenience we adopt an extreme form of
this asymmetry,
k(πt,j) =
½
0.5(πt,j − 1)2 for πt,j ≥ π
+∞ for πt,j < π
.
This, in eﬀect, places a lower bound of π on πt,j. The result is that πt =
Fπ(πet+1, c
e
t+1, gt), equation (1), is replaced by
πt =
½
Hπ(πet+1, ct, gt) if Hπ(π
e
t+1, ct, gt) ≥ π
π, otherwise
.
The qualitative features of the phase diagram depend critically on the
value of π, and I focus on one possible value that leads to particularly inter-
esting results, namely
π = β. (6)
Quantitatively, this choice is perhaps not implausible. If in most sectors there
is great resistance to deflation, but decreases in prices cannot be prevented in
some markets, then an inflation floor at a low rate of deflation might arise.10
9For a recent argument that people strongly resist reductions in wages, see Akerlof and
Shiller (2009), Ch. 9.
10Depending on assumptions about the CRRA parameter, a low rate of deflation might
also arise as a result of zero wage inflation combined with technical progress.
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The assumption π = β is obviously special,11 but the results for this case will
informative also for values π ≈ β.
The resulting phase diagram, shown in Figure 2, is very revealing. It can
be seen that the deflation trap region of divergent paths has been replaced by
a region that converges to a continuum of stationary states at πt = πe = π
and ct = ce = c for 0 ≤ c ≤ cL, where cL is the level of c such that
Hπ(β, cL, g) = π. The pessimistic expectations shock that in Figure A1
leads to a divergent trajectory culminating in continually falling inflation
and consumption, now converges to π = π = β, i.e. a deflation rate equal
to the negative of the discount rate, and a low level of consumption and
output. This set of stationary states constitutes the stagnation regime of the
model. This is a very Keynesian regime, in that it is one in which output is
constrained by the aggregate demand for goods.
The stagnation regime has interesting comparative statics. A small in-
crease in government spending g raises output by an equal amount, i.e. the
government spending multiplier is one. Government spending does not stim-
ulate increases in consumption, but it also does not crowd out consumption.
Evans and Honkapohja (2010) noted this result in the temporary equilib-
rium, for given expectations, and in the stagnation regime the result holds
for the continuum of stagnation regime stationary states. In this regime, an
increase in g increases output y but has no eﬀect on either ct or πt, provided
Fπ(π, c, g) < π.
The stagnation regime also has interesting dynamics that result from suf-
ficiently large increases in g. Using Lemma 1 of Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008) it follows that there is a critical value gˆ such that for g > gˆ we have
Hπ(π, c, g) > π. If g is increased to and held at a value g > gˆ then at this
point πt > π, leading to increasing πe, higher c and higher ce.12 This process
is self-reinforcing, and once (πe, ce) crosses the saddlepath boundary it also
becomes self-sustaining. That is, at this point the natural stabilizing forces
of the economy take over. Government spending can then be reduced back
to normal levels, and the economy will follow a path back to the intended
steady state (π∗, c∗). One way to interpret these results is that the temporary
increase in g provides enough lift to output and inflation that the economy
11And one at which a bifurcation of the system occurs.
12The π˙e = 0 curve is obtained by setting π = πt = πet in equation (1). An increase in
g can be seen as shifting the π˙e = 0 curve down. Once it shifts below the stationary value
of c in the stagnation regime, πt and πet will start to rise.
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Figure 2: The stagnation regime.
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achieves “escape velocity” from the stagnation regime.13 Under a standard
“Leeper-type” rule for setting taxes, the temporary increase in gt leads to a
build-up of debt during the period of increased government spending, and
is then followed by a period in which debt gradually returns to the original
steady state value, due to the reduction in gt to normal levels and a period
of higher taxes. For an illustrative simulation of all the key variables, see
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008).
It is important to note that the impact of temporary increases in gov-
ernment spending does not depend on a failure of Ricardian equivalence. In
the model of Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) and the modified model
here, the impact of government spending is the same whether it is financed
by taxes or by debt. This is also true in the infinite-horizon version of Evans
and Honkapohja (2010) in which we explicitly impose Ricardian Equivalence
on private-agent decision-making. Thus, within our models, the fiscal policy
tool is temporary increases in government spending, not reductions in taxes
or increases in transfers. However, it is possible, of course, that for a variety
of reasons Ricardian Equivalence may fail, e.g. because of the presence of
liquidity-constrained households, in which case tax cuts financed by bond
sales can be eﬀective. Similarly if Ricardian Equivalence fails because long-
horizon households do not internalize the government’s intertemporal budget
constraints, then tax reductions can again be eﬀective. However, the most
reliable fiscal tool is temporary increases in government spending.
What if the condition π = β does not exactly hold? If π 6= β but π ≈ β
then the results can be qualitatively similar for long stretches of time. For
example if π ≈ β and π > β then the targeted steady state will be globally
stable, but the corresponding path followed by the economy once inflation has
fallen to π will include slow increases in c and ce before eventually inflation
increases and the economy returns to the targeted steady state.14 An inter-
esting feature of the modified model is that, under learning, the inflation floor
is not itself a barrier to reaching the targeted steady state. Indeed, it acts
to stabilize the economy in the sense that, in the presence of large negative
13In the April 3, 2010 edition of the Financial Times, Lawrence Summers, the Director
of the US National economic Council, was quoted as saying that the economy “appears to
be moving towards escape velocity.”
14If instead π ≈ β and π < β then the stagnation regime at π will be accomanpanied
by a slow decline in consumption and output. Such a decline would also results if π = β,
with the economy in the stagnation regime, and the policymakers increase the interest
rate above the ZLB R = 1.
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expectation shocks, it prevents the economy from falling into a deflationary
spiral and a divergent path. However, although the economy reaches a stable
region in the stagnation regime, output is persistently depressed below the
steady state that policymakers are aiming to reach.
4 Policy
We now discuss at greater length the policy implications when the economy
is at risk of becoming trapped in the stagnation regime. Although the dis-
cussion is rooted in the model presented, it also will bring in some factors
that go beyond our simple model. We have used a closed-economy model
without capital, a separate labor market, or an explicit role for financial in-
termediation and risk. These dimensions provide scope for additional policy
levers.15
4.1 Fiscal policy
The basic policy implications of the model are quite clear, and consistent with
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2010). If
the economy is hit by factors that deliver a shock to expectations that is not
too large, then the standard monetary policy response will be satisfactory in
the sense that it will ensure the return of the economy to the intended steady
state. However, if there is a large negative shock then standard policy will
be subject to the zero-interest rate lower bound, and for suﬃciently large
shocks even zero interest rates may be insuﬃcient to return the economy to
the targeted steady state. In the modified model of the present paper, the
economy may converge instead to the stagnation regime, in which there is
deflation at a rate equal to the net discount rate and output is depressed. In
this regime consumption is at a low level in line with expectations, which in
turn will have adapted to the households’ recent experience.
If the economy is trapped in this regime, suﬃciently aggressive fiscal pol-
icy, taking the form of temporary increases in government spending, will
15The discussion here is not meant to be exhaustive. The three most glaring omissions,
from the list of policies considered here, are: dealing with the foreclosure problem in the
US, ensuring that adequate lending is available for small businesses, and moving ahead
with the implementation of regulatory reform in the financial sector.
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dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime. A relatively small in-
crease will raise output and employment but will not be suﬃcient to push
the economy out of the stagnation regime. However, a large enough tempo-
rary increase in government spending will push the economy into the stable
region and back to the targeted steady state. This policy would also be
indicated if the economy is en route to the stagnation regime, and may be
merited even if the economy is within the stable region, but close enough to
the unstable region that it would result in a protracted period of depressed
economic activity.
Because of Ricardian equivalence, tax cuts are ineﬀective unless they
are directed towards liquidity constrained households. However, in models
with capital a potentially eﬀective policy is investment tax credits. If the
investment tax credits are time limited then they work not only by reducing
the cost of capital to firms, but also by rescheduling investment from the
future to now or the near future, when it is most needed. Investment tax
credits could also be made state contingent, in the sense that the tax credit
would disappear after explicit macroeconomic goals, e.g. in terms of GDP
growth, are reached.
In the US an eﬀective fiscal stimulus that operates swiftly is federal aid
to state and local governments. This was provided on a substantial scale
through the ARRA in 2009 and 2010, but this money will largely disappear in
2011. Why are states in such diﬃculties? The central reason is that they fail
to smooth their revenues (and expenditures) over the business cycle. States
require themselves to balance the budget, and tend to do this year by year
(or in some States biennium by biennium). Thus, when there is a recession,
state tax revenues decline and they are compelled to reduce expenditures.
This is the opposite of what we want: instead of acting as an automatic
stabilizer, which is what happens at the federal level, budget balancing by
states in recessions acts to intensify the recession. Indeed, in the US the
ARRA fiscal stimulus has largely been oﬀset by reductions in government
spending at the sate and local level.
4.2 Fiscal policy and rainy day funds
This does not have to be. States should follow the recommendation that
macroeconomists have traditionally given to national economies, which is
to balance the budget over the business cycle. This can be done by the
states setting up rainy day funds, building up reserves in booms to use in
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recessions.16 A common objection to this proposal is that if a state builds
up a rainy day fund, then politicians will spend it before the next recession
hits. This objection can be dealt with. Setting up the rainy day fund should
include a provision that drawing on the fund is prohibited unless specified
economic indicators are triggered. The triggers could either be based on
either national or state data (or a combination). For example, a suitable
national indicator would be two successive quarterly declines of real GDP.
State level triggers could be based on the BLS measures of the unemployment
rate, e.g. an increase of at least two percentage points in the unemployment
rate over the lowest rate most recently achieved. Once triggered the fund
would be available for drawing down over a specified period, e.g. three years
or until the indicators improve by specified amounts. After that point, the
rainy day fund would have to be built up again, until am appropriate level is
reached. Obviously there are many provisions that would need to be thought
through carefully and specified in detail. However, the basic point seems
unassailable that this approach provides a rational basis for managing state
and local financing, and that the political objections can be overcome by
specifying the rules in advance.
It is also worth emphasizing that the establishment of rainy day funds
would act to discipline state spending during expansions. Instead of treat-
ing the extra tax revenue generated during booms as free resources, to be
used for additional government spending or for distribution to taxpayers, the
revenue would go into a fund set aside for use during recessions. This is sim-
ply prudent management of state financial resources, which leads to a more
eﬃcient response to aggregate fluctuations.17
Currently (in late 2010), there is clearly a need for fiscal stimulus taking
the form of additional federal aid to states. Politically this looks diﬃcult
because people are distrustful of politicians and concerned about deficits and
debt. Here, therefore, is a proposal: additional federal money to states should
16Of course the size of the fund needs to be adequate. The state of Oregon recently
started up a rainy day fund, which has turned out to be very useful following the recent
recession, but the scale was clearly too small.
17Similar issues arise in the European context. Eurozone countries are committed to
the Stability and Growth Pact, which in principle limits deficit and debt levels of member
countries. However, these limits have been stressed by recent events and enforcement
appears diﬃcult or undesirable in some cases. Reform may therefore be needed. An
appropriate way forward would be to require every member country to set up a rainy day
fund to which contributions are made during the next expansion until a suitable level is
recahed.
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be provided now, contingent on a state agreeing to set up an adequate rainy
day fund, to which contributions would begin as soon as there is a robust
recovery. This proposal has the attraction that it provides states with funds
that are much needed now, to avoid impending layoﬀs of state and local
government employees, but in return for changing their institutions in such a
way that federal help will be much less likely to be needed in future recessions.
4.3 Quantitative easing and the composition of the Fed
balance sheet
Since aggressive fiscal policy in the near term may be politically unpromising,
especially in the US, one must also consider whether more can be done with
monetary policy.
In the version of the model used here, agents use short-horizon decision
rules, based on Euler equations, and once the monetary authorities have
reduced (short) interest rates to zero, there is no scope for further policy eas-
ing. In Evans and Honkapohja (2010) we showed that the central qualitative
features of the model carry over to infinite-horizon decision rules, and the
same would be true of the modified framework here. In this setting there is
an additional monetary policy tool, namely policy announcements directed
toward influencing expectations of future interest rates. By committing to
keep short-term interest rates low for an extended period of time, the Fed
can aim to stimulate consumption. An equivalent policy, which in practice
is complementary, would be to move out in the maturity structure and pur-
chase longer dated bonds. As Evans and Honkapohja (2010) demonstrates,
however, such a policy may still be inadequate: even promising to keep in-
terest rates low forever may be insuﬃcient in the presence of a very large
negative expectational shock.
Since financial intermediation and risk have been central to the recent
financial crisis, and continue to play a key role in the current economy, there
are additional central bank policy interventions that would be natural. One
set of policies is being considered by the Federal Reserve Bank under the
name of “quantitative easing” or QE2. Open market purchases of assets at
longer maturities can reduce interest rates across the term-structure, provid-
ing further channels for stimulating demand. More generally the Fed could
alter its balance sheet to include bonds with some degree of risk. If expansion-
ary fiscal policy is considered infeasible politically, then quantitative easing
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or changing the composition of the Federal Reserve balance sheet becomes
an attractive option.
In an open economy model, there are additional channels for quantitative
easing. If the US greatly expands its money stock, and other countries do
not do so, or do so to a lesser extent, then foreign exchange markets are
likely to conclude that there is likely, in the medium or long run, to be a
greater increase in prices in the US than the rest or the world, and therefore
a relative depreciation of the dollar. Unlike wages and goods prices, which
respond sluggishly to changes in the money supply, foreign exchange markets
often react very quickly to policy changes, and thus quantitative easing could
lead to a substantial depreciation of the dollar now.18 In a more aggressive
version of this policy the Fed would directly purchase foreign bonds. This
would tend to boost net exports and output and help to stimulate growth
in the US. This policy could, of course, be oﬀset by monetary expansions in
other countries, but some countries may be reluctant to do so.19
Another set of policies being discussed involve new or more explicit com-
mitments by policymakers to achieve specified inflation and price level tar-
gets. For example, one proposal would commit to returning to a price level
path obtained by extrapolating using a target inflation rate of, say, 2% p.a.,
from an earlier base, followed by a return to inflation targeting after that level
is achieved. From the viewpoint of adaptive learning, a basic problem with
all of these approaches is that to the extent that expectations are grounded
in data, raising πe may require actual observations of higher inflation rates.
As briefly noted above, policy commitments and announcements may indeed
have some impact on expectations, but the evolution of data will be decisive.
An additional problem, however, is that there are some distributional
consequences that are not benign. Households that are savers, with a portfo-
lio consisting primarily in safe assets like short maturity government bonds,
have already been adversely aﬀected by a monetary policy in which the nom-
inal returns on these assets has been pushed down to near zero. A policy
commitment at this juncture, which pairs an extended period of continued
near zero interest rates with a commitment to use quantitative easing aggres-
sively in order to increase inflation, has a downside of adversely aﬀecting the
wealth position of households who are savers aiming for a low risk portfolio.
18This is the mechanism of the Dornbusch (1976) model.
19And if all countries engaged in monetary expansion, this might increase inflation
expectations.
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4.4 A proposal for a mixed fiscal-monetary stimulus
If political constraints are an impediment to temporary increases in govern-
ment spending at the Federal level, as they currently appear to be in the
United States, it may still be possible to use a fiscal-monetary policy mix
that is eﬀective. State and local government’s are constrained in the United
States to balance their budgets, but there is an exception in most states
for capital projects. At the same time there is a clear-cut need throughout
the United States to increase investment in infrastructure projects, as the
US Society of Civil Engineers has been stressing for some time. In January
2009 the Society gave a grade of D to the nation’s infrastructure. Large
investments will be required in the nation’s bridges, wastewater and sewage
treatment, roads, rail, dams, levees, air traﬃc control and school buildings.
The need for this spending is not particularly controversial. The Society es-
timates $2.2 trillion over five years as the total amount needed (at all levels
of government) to put this infrastructure into a satisfactory state.20 Thus
there is no shortage of useful investment that can be initiated.
The scale of the infrastructure projects needed is appropriate, since a
plausible estimate of the cumulative short-fall of GDP relative to potential
GDP is around $2 trillion21 and the current unemployment rate of 9.6%.22
The timing and inherent lags in such projects appear acceptable. If we are
in the stagnation regime, or heading toward or near the stagnation regime,
then it is likely to be some time before we return to the targeted steady state.
Projects that take several years may then be quite attractive. The historical
evidence of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) indicate that in the aftermath of
recessions associated with banking crises, the recovery is particularly slow.
Furthermore, this area of expenditure appears to be an ideal category
for leading a robust recovery. In the stagnation regime, the central problem
is deficient aggregate demand. In past US past recessions, household con-
sumption and housing construction have often been the sectors that lead the
20For example, see the January 28, 2009, New York Times story “US Infrastructure Is
In Dire Straits, Report Says.”
21Assuming a 6% natural rate of unemployment and an Okun’s law parameter of be-
tween 2 and 2.5 gives a range of $1.7 trillion to $2.1 trillion for the GDP shortfall if the
unemployment rate, over the next three years, averages 9% , 8% and 7%, respectively.
22For comparison the ARRA stimulus program is curently estimated by the Congessional
Budget Oﬃce to have reduced the unemployment rate, relative to what it would otherwise
have been, by between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage points. A number of commentators argued
in early 2009 that the scale of the ARRA might be inadequate.
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economic recovery. But given the excesses of the housing boom and the high
indebtedness of households, do we want to rely on, or encourage, a rapid
growth of consumption and residential construction in the near future? It
would appear much more sensible to stimulate spending in the near term on
infrastructure projects that are clearly beneficial, and that do not require
us to encourage households to reduce their saving rate. Furthermore, once
a robust recovery is underway, these capital investments will raise poten-
tial output and growth because of their positive supply-side impact on the
nation’s capital stock.
Howwould this be financed? State and local governments can be expected
to be well-informed about a wide range of needed infrastructure projects,
but financing the projects requires issuing state or municipal bonds. Many
states and localities are currently hard pressed to balance their budget, and
this may make it diﬃcult for them to issue bonds to finance the projects
at interest rates that are attractive. Here both the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury can play key roles. The Treasury could announce that, up to some
stated amount, they would be willing to purchase state and local bonds for
qualifying infrastructure projects. The Treasury would provide financing,
at relatively low interest rates, for productive investment projects that are
widely agreed to be urgently needed. Ideally there would be a Federal subsidy
to partially match the state or local government expenditure on infrastructure
investment, as has often been true in the past. This would both make the
investment more attractive and help to orchestrate a coordinated program
over the near term.
The ARRA did include a substantial provision for funding infrastructure
through “Build America Bonds,” which has provided a subsidy by the Trea-
sury to state and local governments issuing bonds for infrastructure projects.
(Interest on these bonds is not tax-exempt, so the subsidy is partially oﬀset
by greater federal taxes received on interest). The Build America Bonds have
been very popular, but there is clearly room for a much larger infrastructure
spending at the state and local level.
The Treasury could be involved in vetting and rationing the proposed
projects, ensuring geographic diversity as well as quality and feasibility. One
possibility would be for the President to announce a plan that encourages
states and localities to submit proposals for infrastructure projects, which
are then assessed. To finance their purchases of state and municipal bonds,
the Treasury would issue bonds with a maturity in line with those acquired.
For the Treasury there would be no obvious on-budget implications, since
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the extra Treasury debt issued by the Treasury to finance purchases of the
state and municipal bonds would be oﬀset by holdings of those bonds.
What would be the role of the Federal Reserve? The increase in infrastruc-
ture projects would go hand-in-glove with a policy of quantitative easing in
which the Fed buys longer-dated US Treasuries, extending low interest rates
further out the yield curve. In eﬀect, the Fed would provide financing to
the Treasury, and the Treasury would provide financing to states and local
government, at rates that make investment in infrastructure projects par-
ticularly attractive now and in the near future. In principle, the Federal
Reserve could also directly purchase the state and municipal bonds. Alter-
natively they could provide financing indirectly by making purchases in the
secondary market for municipal bonds.
Thus this proposal meshes well with the current discussion within the
Federal Reserve Bank for quantitative easing, with the additional feature
that the injections of money in exchange for longer-dated Treasuries would
be in part aimed at providing financing for new spending on infrastructure
investment projects.
The three proposals discussed above are complementary. Federal aid to
states and localities is needed in the near term to reduce current state budget
problems and avoid layoﬀs. A commitment by states to set up rainy day funds
during the next expansion will help ensure that state budgeting is put on a
secure footing going forward. A large infrastructure program can provide
a major source of demand that will also expand the nation’s capital stock
and enhance future productivity. Finally, quantitative easing by the Federal
Reserve can help provide an environment in which the terms for financing
infrastructure projects is attractive.
5 Conclusions
In the model of this paper, if an adverse shock to the economy leads to a
large downward shift in consumption and inflation expectations, the resulting
path can converge to a stagnation regime, in which output and consumption
remain at low levels, accompanied by steady deflation. Small increases in
government spending will increase output, but may leave the economy within
the stagnation regime. However, a suﬃciently large temporary increase in
government spending can dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime
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and restore the natural stabilizing forces of the economy, eventually returning
the economy to the targeted steady state.
The aggressive monetary policy response of the Federal Reserve Bank over
2007-9, together with the TARP intervention and the limited ARRA fiscal
stimulus, may well have been helped to avert a second Depression in the
US. However, recent US data show continued high levels of unemployment,
modest rates of GDP growth, and very low and possibly declining inflation.
Although the economy has stabilized, there remains the possibility of either
convergence to the stagnation regime or of an unusually protracted period
before a robust recovery begins.
Although forecasting GDP growth is notoriously diﬃcult, it seems almost
certain that in the near-term the economy will continue to have substantial
excess capacity and elevated unemployment. In this setting there is a case
for further expansionary policies. My recommendations include a combina-
tion of additional federal aid to state and local governments, in return for a
commitment by states to set up rainy day funds during the next expansion,
quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, and a large-scale infrastructure
program, funded indirectly by the US Treasury and by the Federal Reserve
as part of the program of quantitative easing.
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Appendix
The framework for the model is from Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja
(2008), except that random shocks are omitted and the interest-rate rule is
modified as discussed in the main text. There is a continuum of household-
firms, which produce a diﬀerentiated consumption good under monopolistic
competition and price-adjustment costs. There is also a government which
uses both monetary and fiscal policy and can issue public debt as described
below. Agent j’s problem is
Max E0
∞X
t=0
βtUt,j
µ
ct,j,
Mt−1,j
Pt
, ht,j, πt,j
¶
st. ct,j +mt,j + bt,j +Υt,j = mt−1,jπ−1t +Rt−1π−1t bt−1,j +
Pt,j
Pt
yt,j,
where ct,j is the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption aggregator, Mt,j and mt,j denote
nominal and real money balances, ht,j is the labor input into production,
bt,j denotes the real quantity of risk-free one-period nominal bonds held by
the agent at the end of period t, Υt,j is the lump-sum tax collected by the
government, Pt,j is the price of consumption good j, πt,j =
Pt,j
Pt−1,j , yt,j is
output of good j, Pt is the aggregate price level and the inflation rate is
πt = Pt/Pt−1. The utility function has the parametric form
Ut,j =
c1−σ1t,j
1− σ1
+
χ
1− σ2
µ
Mt−1,j
Pt
¶1−σ2
−
h1+εt,j
1 + ε
− γk (πt,j) ,
where σ1, σ2, ε, γ > 0. The final term parameterizes the cost of adjusting
prices in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982), specifically taking the quadratic
form
k(πt,j) =
1
2
(πt,j − 1)2.
Production function for good j is given by yt,j = hαt,j, where 0 < α < 1. Out-
put is diﬀerentiated and firms operate under monopolistic competition. Each
firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve given by Pt,j = (yt,j/Yt)
−1/ν Pt.
Here Pt,j is the profit maximizing price set by firm j consistent with its pro-
duction yt,j, and ν > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two goods.
Yt is aggregate output, which is exogenous to the firm.
Using the household-firm’s first-order Euler conditions for optimal choices
of prices Pt,j and consumption ct,j, and using the representative agent as-
sumption, we get the following equations for the temporary equilibrium at
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time t:
(πt − 1)πt = β
¡
πet+1 − 1
¢
πet+1 +
ν
αγ
(ct + gt)
(1+ε)/α (7)
−γ−1 (ν − 1) (ct + gt)c−σ1t
and
ct = c
e
t+1(π
e
t+1/βRt)
σ1, (8)
where we assume πt > 0.5.
The government’s flow budget constraint is bt+mt+Υt = gt+mt−1π−1t +
Rt−1π
−1
t bt−1, where bt is the real quantity of government debt, and Υt is the
real lump-sum tax collected. The rule for lump-sum taxes is Υt = κ0+κbt−1,
where β−1 − 1 < κ < 1 so that fiscal policy is “passive” in the terminology
of Leeper (1991). The interest-rate rule, Rt = f(πet+1), is assumed to be a
linear spline
f(πe) = min{1, (π∗/β) + θ(πe − π∗)}
where θ > β−1.
Figure A1: Divergent paths can result from large negative expectation
shocks.
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Under adaptive learning, for the case without an inflation floor, the phase
diagram, giving the dynamics in the small gain case, is shown in the accom-
panying Figure. Incorporating an inflation floor at π = β, as in Section 3,
leads to the stagnation regime case shown in Figure 2 and emphasized in the
main text of the current paper.
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